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State-wide reports on police tra±c stops and searches summarize very large populations,
making them potentially powerful tools for identifying racial bias, particularly when statistics
on search outcomes are included. But when the reported statistics con°ate searches involving
di®erent levels of police discretion, standard tests for racial bias are not applicable. This paper
develops a model of police search decisions that allows for non-discretionary searches and derives
tests for racial bias in data that mixes di®erent search types. Our tests reject unbiased policing
as an explanation of the disparate impact of motor-vehicle searches on minorities in Missouri.
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A recent wave of public concern about the disparate impact of police behavior on racial and ethnic
minorities has led to a signi¯cant increase in the publication of statistical reports regarding the
impact by race of police actions in the United States. For instance, according to the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (2001), 16 state police agencies required collection of race and ethnicity data
for all tra±c stops as of March 2001, compared to only seven states in 1999. An additional 23
state agencies required collection of such data when arrests or violence ensued. The objective of
publishing these reports is to allow public monitoring of racial or ethnic inequities in the burden
of police activities, but it is not clear how or even whether such aggregate data can be useful in
measuring discrimination against minorities by the police.
In regards to tra±c stops and vehicle searches, these data typically con¯rm the hypothesis
of disparate impact by race: motorists of some minority groups, such as African-Americans and
Hispanics, are much more likely than other motorists to be subjected to police searches of their
vehicles. For instance, Gross and Barnes (2002) ¯nd that on a given stretch of I-95 in Maryland
over a 5-year period, black drivers were twice as likely as white motorists to be stopped and ¯ve
times as likely to be searched. Many commentators agree that this situation is unfair to members
of racial minorities, but tend to assume that there is a trade-o® between fairness and e±cient
policing. Indeed, this is implicit in the term racial pro¯ling, which refers to the standard police
practice of basing search decisions on the ¯t between the motorist and descriptions (pro¯les) of
typical law-breakers.4
The racial pro¯ling story is thus an example of statistical discrimination in which the police are
racially unbiased, in the sense that they do not care about race directly, but only as an instrument
to predict criminality. However, police might also be racially biased in the sense that they care
about race directly; for instance they may derive utility from searching minority motorists, in which
case statistical discrimination will lead them to search minorities at a higher rate than if they were
unbiased. If this is the case, then the public controversy over the apparent dilemma between e®ective
policing and racial pro¯ling may actually harm minorities by camou°aging instances of racial bias
in the sense de¯ned above. Disparate impact caused by racist policing is probably not the whole
story behind the racial pro¯ling controversy, but if such a bias explains even a part of the problem,
then disparate impact can be reduced in a non-controversial way by testing for and eliminating bias
that does not ¯t the racial pro¯ling model. In this perspective, the essential question is: how can
the aggregate pro¯ling statistics published at the state level be used to distinguish racial pro¯ling
from racial bias?
In this paper, we examine ways to apply a well-known test, the comparison of average search-
success rates by race, to summary statistics by race where di®erent kinds of search are aggregated
together. The key properties that we require to analyze a report is that it include, for each
police force, reports of search-success rates by race, as well as the proportion of searches that were
4The ACLU, on its racial-pro¯ling web site <http://www.aclu.org/pro¯ling>, gives the following de¯nition of
racial pro¯ling: \this practice of substituting skin color for evidence as a grounds for suspicion by law enforcement
o±cials". The Department of Justice, in its Fact Sheet of March 17th, 2003, says \Racial pro¯ling rests on the
erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct
than any particular individual of other races or ethnicities".
2discretionary (as opposed to mandatory, or non-discretionary) because we presume that police
agents have the ability to exercise racial bias only when searches are not compulsory. To the best
of our knowledge Missouri is the only state with a public-access tra±c-stop report, published by the
Missouri Attorney General's O±ce (henceforth AGO), that ful¯lls these criteria. A recent survey
of state tra±c-stop data sets by the U.S. Department of Justice (2001) does not even mention types
of search or search outcomes in their report on data collection policies. The results of our paper
suggest that this is a serious oversight that limits the ability to monitor the racial bias of police
forces.5
The tests that we develop here are based on an equilibrium argument by Knowles, Persico and
Todd (2001) (henceforth KPT). The key assumptions are: 1) police choose search rates by race
to maximize overall ¯nd rates, 2) the race of motorists is related to their probability of carrying
contraband at a given search probability, and 3) motorists respond to higher risks of search by
reducing their probability of carrying. In the equilibrium with unbiased policing, the success rate
for discretionary searches will be equal across all observable groups that are searched with interior
probabilities. If however the police are biased against a given group of motorists, this will be
revealed by a lower success rate in such searches. KPT found that success rates for the Maryland
State Police did not vary signi¯cantly by race, supporting racial pro¯ling, in the sense of unbiased
policing, as an explanation for higher search rates of black motorists.
In contrast to the Maryland data, search success rates in the Missouri data are often much
lower for blacks and Hispanics than for white motorists. However the 2001 report stated that the
reason lower success rates for minorities did not imply biased policing was that minorities are more
often arrested in tra±c stops, and police are required to search the motorist and vehicle as part
of the arrest procedure.6 Since the success rates that we observe aggregate over both types of
search of a given race by a given police force, it is possible for unbiased policing to result in lower
overall success rates for minorities. Therefore the KPT test is not applicable when ¯nd rates on
non-discretionary searches are lower than on discretionary searches.
We extend the KPT model to incorporate non-discretionary searches, and propose a way to
test this explanation of racial disparities. We use basic properties of probabilities to infer non-
parametric bounds on success rates for discretionary searches, and derive con¯dence intervals for
these bounds. We then explore two ways to sharpen these bounds: using additional information, and
making auxiliary assumptions on the distribution of the ¯nd rates of non-discretionary searches.
As additional information, we impose the restriction implied by the AGO statement, that non-
discretionary searches have lower success rates. As auxiliary assumptions, we impose parameterized
restrictions on the disparity between the success rates of the two types of searches. We compare
our results with these tests to the results under the KPT test, which is based on the assumption
that all searches are discretionary.
Our main empirical results are (statistics below refer to tests with 95-percent con¯dence inter-
5During the ¯nal revision of this paper, we learned that a Minnesota state report for 2002 does in fact contain
statistics on success rates by each type of search.
6The exact quote is \The contraband hit rate for whites was 22 percent, compared with 15 percent for Blacks and
11 percent for Hispanics. This means that, on average, searches of Blacks and Hispanics produce less contraband
than do those of whites. This di®erence is most likely attributable to the higher arrest rates for Blacks and Hispanics,
circumstances that compel a search."
3vals):
1. Under the KPT test, we reject equality of search rates for police forces representing at least
46 percent of all discretionary searches.
2. Police forces that are found to be biased under our strictly non-parametric bounds account
for at most 2 percent of all discretionary searches. Despite the apparently large di®erences
in success rates by race, the proportions of non-discretionary searches are too large to rule
out equality by race of ¯nd rates for discretionary searches.
3. Our test based on the AGO restriction ¯nds that police forces biased against minorities
account for at least 30 percent of all discretionary searches; while this is much more than
under the basic non-parametric bounds, it is signi¯cantly less than under the KPT test. Hence
we ¯nd that a large fraction of searches in Missouri are carried out by police forces for which
we do not reject unbiased policing.
4. Most of the police bias identi¯ed by the AGO test is directed against Hispanics rather than
blacks: the share of searches by police biased against blacks is only 7 percent, compared to
40 percent for police biased against Hispanics.
5. Black motorists are most at risk from biased police when travelling through areas where
blacks have a relatively small share of population. Similarly, Hispanics are most at risk in
neighborhoods with a small minority share of the population.
6. Standard measures of disparity between racial composition of the resident population and the
population searched or stopped by police are not useful predictors of racial bias according to
our tests.7
Our non-parametric bounds are based on Horowitz and Manski (1995). Previous work by
Kreider and Pepper (2003) and Dominitz and Sherman (2003) shows the usefulness of additional
assumptions to sharpen bounds. Our use of the AGO statement most closely resembles the \ordered
outcomes" assumption described in Manski (1995), and used by Pepper (2000). The con¯dence
intervals we use to implement our test are derived from Horowitz and Manski (2000) and Imbens
and Manski (2003). Our problem is somewhat simpler than those described above, however, as we
do not have to make inferences about the unconditional distribution of ¯nd rates, which in our case
is identi¯ed by the data, but only about the ¯nd rate conditional on discretionary search.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we extend the model of Knowles,
Persico and Todd (2001) to the case where some searches are non-discretionary and derive formally
the various tests described above. Section 3 describes the data for Missouri. In Section 4 we
describe our main results from applying the bounds tests to these data. In Section 5 we present a
statistical analysis of the di®erences between the tests, and in Section 6 we characterize the police
forces we ¯nd to be biased. We conclude with a summary and some caveats.
7This type of index is intended to re°ect a more traditional measure of disparate impact, based on empirical
studies of driver population, which is often used in courts as an indicator of racial bias, for instance in the seminal
case New Jersey v. Soto, 734 A.2d, Superior Court of New Jersey, 1996, and Zingra® et al. (2000).
42 The Racial Pro¯ling Model
We suppose that there is a population of motorists who decide whether or not to carry contraband.
There are three types of motorists; non-felons (z = 0), type-1 felons (z = 1) and type-2 felons
(z = 2). Motorists also di®er according to race, r 2 fb;wg and other characteristics, c. They are
randomly stopped by the police with an exogenous probability ¼s that is independent of motorist
characteristics. When the police agent makes the stop, she learns whether the motorist is a felon;
if so, she arrests the motorist and searches his vehicle, otherwise the police agent observes the
motorist's characteristics and decides whether or not to search his vehicle for contraband. This
gives rise to two types of search; in the ¯rst case, these are non-discretionary searches (d = 0),
and the second these are discretionary (d = 1): All searches of motorists who carry contraband
are assumed to be successful, in which case the motorist is subjected to a punishment that is
independent of his characteristics, but might depend on his type. We also assume that all searches
reported to be successful were of motorists who were in fact carrying contraband.
We assume that police agents get utility from ¯nding contraband. In order to re°ect the
possibility of racial bias, we allow the cost of searching motorists, tr, to depend on the race of the
motorist. We also assume that police know the function p(gjc;r;z) that gives the probability of
a motorist carrying contraband. Let the density function ¹(c;r;z) represent the distribution of c
across motorists who are not felons. Let the payo® to police from ¯nding contraband be normalized





[p(gjc;r;d = 1) ¡ tr]° (c;r)¹(c;r;z = 0)dc
¾
:
The solution implies that ° (c;r) 2 (0;1) only if the expected payo® from a search is zero.
We assume that whether the motorist is a felon does not a®ect the utility º (c;r) from carrying
contraband, but may a®ect the disutility j (c;r;z) from being subjected to a successful search.
There are no costs of being subjected to unsuccessful search. If motorists carry contraband with
some positive probability p(gjc;r;z) 2 (0;1); then they must be indi®erent between carrying and
not carrying. For non-felon motorists, this implies the unconditional search probability satis¯es:
(2) ° (c;r) =
º (c;r)
¼s [º (c;r) + j (c;r;0)]
:
Felon motorists on the other hand must take into account that they face a higher probability
of being searched than non-felon motorists. This is because a greater number of motorists are
stopped than are eventually searched, but all felons who are stopped are searched. Since non-felons
are indi®erent at a lower search probability, the carrying probability for felon motorists would be
zero if the payo®s were identical; hence to model positive carrying rates for felons, we allow the
utility gain from carrying contraband to be higher for some felons. We assume that for type-1
felons, arrest does not a®ect the net utility gain from carrying contraband, but for type 2 felons the
utility loss of being found with contraband is smaller. This may arise for instance if minor o®enses
like carrying contraband tend to be ignored when sentencing such felons.
5Taken together, conditions (1) and (2) imply an equilibrium in which the probability of carrying
equals the cost per search and police impose higher search rates on motorists with higher utility of
carrying contraband (relative to the punishment utility). The main result of the KPT model is that
search rates may di®er by the race or other characteristics of the motorist, but if the cost of search is
independent of motorist characteristics, and if carrying probabilities are interior, then success rates
of discretionary searches are equalized across all groups of motorists that are distinguishable to the
police. The economic force that drives this result is that if some observable group of motorists were
to carry contraband at a higher rate than the rest, then the police would allocate more resources
to searching that group, and the observed ¯nd rate would be higher for that group. This would
lead motorists of that group to reduce their probability of carrying contraband.
In addition to the implications for discretionary searches, the current model implies carrying
rates for felons that depend on the size of the punishment j (c;r;0) relative to j (c;r;2), and the
distribution of felons across felony types. Let ¼ri =
R
¹(c;r;i)dc be the proportion of motorists of
race r who are type-i felons. If j (c;r;2) < j (c;r;0) then for each groups (c;r), if the non-felons
carry with positive probability, then type-1 felons do not carry, while type-2 felons carry contraband
for sure. The ¯nd rate on non-discretionary search is thus given by the relative frequency of type-2
felons:







A particular racial group r may therefore be subjected to discretionary search at a higher rate
than other groups for two possible reasons. First, non-felon motorists of race r may experience
a higher utility gain º (c;r) ¡ j (c;r;0) from carrying contraband, and second, the police agent
may have a lower cost of search tr for that race. The ¯rst explanation corresponds to statistical
discrimination, and the second to racial bias. It is clear that in a legal context, such as the
sources cited in the introduction, the term `racial pro¯ling' is intended to refer to the ¯rst type of
discrimination, although public usage may confound the two.
KPT discuss two related issues that may arise with the interpretation of the model. First, the
above results for discretionary search apply only to groups of motorists who, in equilibrium, carry
contraband and are searched with interior probabilities. KPT show that it is trivial to extend
the model to allow for types that are searched with probabilities zero or one.8 Second, the reader
may object, on the grounds of implausibility, to the result that motorists choose a mixed strategy.
However KPT show there is an alternative interpretation of the model, in which the equilibrium
properties are identical, such that motorists do not choose mixed strategies, but instead each group
of motorists distinguishable to the police contains types who carry at the equilibrium search rate
and types who do not.
8In our model, the ex ante search probability is bounded above by the stop probability, ¼s, while in KPT the
upper bound is one. Thus the possibility of motorists who are undeterred even by the maximum search rate may
seem to be more relevant in our model. As Becker (1968) points out, however, when punishments are su±ciently
severe, even a low probability of detection will have a deterrence e®ect.
62.1 Testing for unbiased policing
In this section, we develop non-parametric bounds on the success rates of discretionary searches, and
then test whether con¯dence intervals around these bounds overlap. We sharpen these bounds in
two ways: by using additional information, and by making auxiliary assumptions on the distribution
of the ¯nd rates of non-discretionary searches.
A key implication of the equilibrium is that, for motorists subject to discretionary searches
with some interior probability, the average search success rate p(gjc;r;z = 0) depends only on the
search cost. Thus in the absence of racial bias, the success rate will not depend on the observable
characteristics of the motorists searched. On the other hand, if racial bias leads to higher search
rates for a given class (c;r), then it must be the case that the success rate of searching that class
will be lower, as motorists respond by reducing their carrying probability.
2.1.1 The KPT Test: Equality of Success Rates
The essence of the test by KPT is therefore to check whether the observed search rates di®er by
race of the motorist or by other characteristics. It is important to note that this test does not
require identifying the marginal motorist of each race, as is the case with standard applications
of outcomes-based testing. This makes the test particularly well suited to analyzing summary
statistics, as in the current paper, where motorist characteristics are not available at an individual
level. When individual data are available, then the KPT test applies directly; it su±ces to compute
the mean success rates of the discretionary searches on each race of motorist, and test whether the
di®erences among these rates are statistically signi¯cant. In the absence of individual data, the
same direct test can be applied, provided that the statistics were generated from discretionary
searches only.
When the test is to be applied to summary statistics that combine both discretionary and non-
discretionary data however, then this test is no longer valid. While in the original KPT model
lower success rates indicate taste-based discrimination, in our model, di®erent success rates of
non-discretionary searches may also be an explanation of di®erent observed success rates. Before
concluding that di®erences in success rates indicate biased policing, it is therefore necessary to ask
whether it is likely or even possible that the rate of non-discretionary search can explain these
di®erences.
2.1.2 The HM Test: Non-parametric bounds
Since probabilities are bounded and must sum to one, it is theoretically possible to reject unbiased
policing at the level of the individual police force by establishing upper and lower bounds for the
success rates of searches. To clarify our approach, let Pr
d be the success rate for type-d searches.
The idea, derived from Horowitz and Manski (1995), is to compute the success rates Pr
1 for each
race r for each police force under extreme assumptions about the success rates in non-discretionary
searches, Pr
0. This de¯nes the identi¯cation region, the range of possible success rates for each racial
group. If the range of success rates of searches on blacks overlaps with that of white motorists,
then no inference is possible. On the other hand, if there is a su±ciently high probability that the
7lower bound on the success rate for white motorists is higher than the upper bound on the success
rate for black motorists, then we can reject unbiased policing.







The success rate of non-discretionary searches of felons is Pr





Suppose the success rate we observe, Qr; is the mean over searches of both types. Then letting
¼r = ¼r1 + ¼r2, this is given by:
(3) Qr = (1 ¡ ¼r)Pr
1 + ¼rPr
0:
Even if we observe ¼r; the problem is that the data does not identify Pr
1 : we would need to
know both ¼r and Pr
0: By solving equation (3) for Pr
1, given that Pr












We derive con¯dence intervals that contain the parameter Pr
1 with probability ®: These extend
beyond the bounds by a distance D(®), which we derive in the appendix. Our HM test rejects
unbiased policing if the con¯dence interval on the search success rate for searches of white motorists
lies entirely above that of black motorists.10
2.1.3 The AGO test: Sharpening the Bounds with Additional Information
These bounds can be made sharper using additional information or assumptions. For instance,
the Missouri AGO report implies that non-discretionary searches have lower success rates.11 In
terms of our model, we take this to mean Pr
0 · Pr
1: This is an example of an \ordered outcome"
assumption, as described by Manski (1995); imposing this information on equation (3) serves to










In this case, the bounds for Pr
1 are tighter than the previous bounds for Pr
1 in expression (4), as
the lower bound corresponds to the probability of the observable search success Qr, and the upper
9These bounds are equivalent to those derived in Horowitz and Manski (1995), Corollary 1.2.
10Since probabilities are bounded in [0;1], for the purposes of our tests we e®ectively consider the interval
[maxf0; ^ PL ¡ Dg;minf1; ^ PH + Dg], where ^ PL and ^ PH are the sample lower and upper bounds.
11This view was con¯rmed by one of the consultants who prepared the report, professor Scott Decker of the
University of Missouri.
8bound corresponds to the upper bound in expression (4).12
To implement this test on ¯nite samples, we derive con¯dence intervals for the identi¯cation
region de¯ned by the bounds; the derivation is shown in the appendix. We reject unbiased policing
whenever the con¯dence interval around the identi¯cation region for the success rate on searches of
white motorists lies above that of black motorists.13 Thus the condition, Pr
0 · Pr
1, which may raise
the lower bounds, but has no e®ect on the upper bounds, will tend to result in a greater rate of
rejection than the non-parametric bounds in (4). The opposite restriction, Pr
0 ¸ Pr
1; would lower
the upper bounds, but have no e®ect on the lower bounds. This in general would also increase the
rate of rejection. Hence, in general, the bounds would be tightened no matter what the sign of the
restriction, so long as the same condition holds for both black and white motorists.14
3 The Data
We analyze statistics on tra±c stops and searches from the 2001 edition of the Annual Report
on Missouri Tra±c Stops, published on the web by the Missouri Attorney General's O±ce.15
According to the Missouri state law section 590.650, RSMo (2000), enacted August 28, 2000, every
law enforcement agency in the state is required to compile a report containing summary information
of all tra±c stops made by the agency and to submit it to the o±ce of the state Attorney General
by March 1st of each year. The report for 2001 includes 609 law enforcement agencies out of a total
of 668 in the state. Tra±c stops in the report are made only for alleged violations of motor vehicle
statutes or ordinances, and the reports do not include other stops, such as those of suspicious
vehicles. The information reported in the forms includes a number of other variables, such as the
category of moving violation that motivated the stop. The number of searches reported includes
searches of drivers and of the property of the driver, but not those where only a passenger is
searched. The report summarizes 1,389,947 tra±c stops, of which 99,860 resulted in searches and
76,567 in arrests.
The report provides counts of stops and searches by racial category for each law enforcement
agency in the state that reported data to the AGO. But the individual records for each tra±c stop
are not provided in the Annual Report, and were not available for the current paper. Thus the only
tabulations possible are by race and by police agency, not by any other variables present in the
report.
The AGO requires police o±cers to classify the driver's race or minority status on the basis
of visual observation. The idea is that while this may not be altogether objective, the object of
interest is the o±cer's impression of the driver's status; police are not required to ask motorists
their race. It is not clear from the documentation how visual observation is meant to distinguish
12In equation (3) let P
r
0 vary from 0 to P
r
1 and solve for P
r
1.
13Note that while the con¯dence interval in the HM test contains the parameter P
r
1 with probability ®, the
con¯dence interval in our other tests contains the identi¯cation region with probability ®.Imbens and Manski (2003)
show that the latter contains the former, so our tests tend to reject less often than would tests based on the ¯rst type
of con¯dence interval. We use the second type of interval for reasons of tractability.
14Clearly the bounds can be tightened only if the AGO model is correct, and only the HM bounds provide a true
lower bound because they are derived from the least restrictive model.
15URL: <http://www.ago.state.mo.us>.
9Hispanics from other motorists.
The reports also list the numbers of searches motivated by the di®erent types of probable cause
used as pretext to conduct the search. These are Consent, Inventory, Drug/Alcohol odor, Incident
to the Arrest, Plain-view contraband, Reasonable suspicion of weapon, Drug-dog alert, and Other.
In particular, a search is classi¯ed as Incident to the Arrest (henceforth ITA) if the search follows
an arrest made solely on information derived from the tra±c stop.
Arrests made on information based solely on the tra±c stop result in the police o±cer being
forced to search the driver and the vehicle. In the 2000 report, the Attorney General, Jay Nixon,
states: \A motorist with an outstanding arrest warrant will, and should, be arrested and will, and
should, be searched pursuant to that arrest." The 2001 report states that when arrests are made
on the basis of the stop only, searches are \almost always performed," and that arrests \compel a
search." Thus ITA searches are non-discretionary; we assume that all other reported searches are
discretionary.16 In terms of our model, ITA searches correspond to police stops of felons of either
type, while discretionary searches are of non-felons.
We have restricted our analysis to the three main types of law enforcement agencies: police
departments, sheri® departments, and state troopers. The excluded law enforcement agencies
include minor agencies such as park rangers, college police departments, and airport security. We
have also restricted the study to the three largest racial or ethnic groups: white, African-American,
and Hispanic drivers, excluding three smaller categories: Asian, American-Indian and Other.
Because our analysis focuses on discretionary searches, we have additionally excluded from
the sample agencies where all searches of minority motorists were non-discretionary. Finally, for
our tests we have selected those agencies that reported 5 or more searches for both white and
African-American drivers and those that reported 5 or more searches for both white and Hispanic
motorists. Despite these restrictions, our sample accounts for almost all searches in the report, as
the police forces we exclude tend to conduct very few motorist searches. Our ¯nal sample of 191
law enforcement agencies represents about 83 percent of all stops, and 85 percent of all searches in
the report.
[Table 1 about here.]
In Table 1 we present summary statistics of tra±c stops and searches from the report, broken
down by racial groups. The unit of observation in this table is the individual police force. From this
table we learn that the total number of tra±c stops in our sample is 1,158,922, of which 963,074
correspond to white drivers, 174,193 correspond to black drivers, and 21,655 to Hispanic drivers.
The total number of searches is 84,652, of which 61,209 correspond to white drivers; 20,574 were
searches of black drivers, and 2,869 were searches of Hispanic drivers. Of the total number of
searches, 44,475 were non-discretionary, or ITA. On average, each police force accounted for 6,067
stops, of which 5,042 stops were of white drivers, 912 stops were of black drivers, and 113 stops were
of Hispanic drivers. On average, each law enforcement agency accounted for 443 searches, leading
16This view was also con¯rmed by professor Scott Decker. He said: \ITA hit rates are lower in general because
they are mandatory, required in all circumstances. Often this means that there is no other objective reason to search,
such as visible contraband, occupants of the car displaying signs of intoxication (drug or alcohol), plain view, etc."
10to 320 searches of white drivers, 107 searches of black motorists, and 15 searches of Hispanics.
There is large variation across agencies in the number of stops and searches. The table indicates
that about half of the agencies conducted less than 23 searches of black drivers and less than 5
searches of Hispanic drivers. In contrast, the median number of searches of white drivers was 131.17
The table includes the three measures of search success we use in our analysis: (1) searches
where drugs were found, (2) searches where contraband in general was found, and (3) searches that
resulted in an arrest. Hence 14,434 searches resulted in drug ¯nds, and 17,515 resulted in general
contraband ¯nds, while 11,630 searches resulted in arrests.18 This table additionally presents the
counts of tra±c stops that indicate other characteristics of the drivers, such as age and gender, but
these were not used in the analysis.
The median values for search success among black motorists are equal to 3 and equal to 0 for
Hispanic drivers. This is because many agencies reported no ¯nds among minorities.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figures 1-3 show the distribution of the fraction of non-discretionary, or ITA, searches by police
force and race. In each case, the distribution only includes agencies that reported at least 5 searches
for each racial group. There were 27 police forces that reported no ITA searches of whites, 6 agencies
that reported no ITA searches of black drivers, and 6 agencies that reported no ITA searches of
Hispanics. When the ITA frequency is zero, the observed searches for the category of motorist
in question are discretionary. The charts indicate that most police forces, however, had positive
ITA frequencies, and therefore it is important to take into account the e®ect of non-discretionary
searches.
[Table 2 about here.]
In Table 2 we present another view of the numbers in Table 1, now expressed as fractions of
total stops or searches. We learn from this table that in the aggregate, about 7 percent of stops
result in searches, and that the probability of being searched given a tra±c stop is much higher for
Hispanics (about 0.13), and for blacks (about 0.11), compared to whites (about 0.06). About half of
the searches are non-discretionary or ITA. Again, this rate is higher for Hispanics (about 0.53), and
even higher for blacks (about 0.59), than for white drivers (about 0.50). Of our measures of search
success, all three rates are much higher for white drivers. For Hispanic drivers, the probability
that a search will result in drug ¯nds, contraband ¯nds, or arrests are, respectively, 0.08, 0.11, and
17The summary statistics of Tables 1 and 2 were computed using data from all these 191 agencies to compute
correctly the sum of searches, but the comparison tests for black and Hispanic drivers were carried out separately
with only those agencies which reported at least 5 searches of both white and minority drivers.
18The measure of contraband includes drugs, alcohol, currency, weapons, or stolen property. The measure of
searches resulting in arrests was made available in the data provided to us by the AGO, but it is not included in the
Annual Report. The measure of arrests included in the report does not distinguish arrests resulting from stops only
or from the search outcome.
110.08. For black drivers, the probabilities are 0.12, 0.15, and 0.13. For white drivers, these numbers
are 0.19, 0.22, and 0.14. The fraction of tra±c stops with drivers age 29 or younger is about 50
percent for blacks and whites, but it is higher for Hispanics (about 58 percent). The fraction of
tra±c stops with male drivers is about 66 percent for blacks and whites, but it is also higher for
Hispanics (about 83 percent).
In Table 2 we present a measure of racial disparity that indicates the incidence of tra±c stops
and searches among racial groups relative to the group's size in the population. The disparity
index in terms of tra±c stops is included for each law enforcement agency in the Annual Report
and forms the basis for the analysis presented by the Missouri Attorney General of the problem of
disparate impact and racial bias of law enforcement. This measure equals the share of tra±c stops
of a given group divided by the group's population share among the total population of driving
age.19 We also computed the disparity index in terms of searches. The interpretation of these
disparity measures is as follows. If the disparity index exceeds 1 the group is over-represented
relative to its share of the population. The table shows that whites and Hispanics are neither over-
represented nor under-represented in terms of tra±c stops, relative to their share of population,
but blacks are over-represented and are being stopped at a rate 48 percent higher than their share
of the population. In terms of the share of searches, the disparity index for blacks is 2.40 and for
Hispanics 1.86, indicating that both minorities are strongly over-represented in the search statistics,
relative to the population composition of the locations where the police forces are based.
4 Results
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 summarizes the results for the di®erent types of bounds we constructed according to the
analysis in Section 2. The numbers in the table give the percent of all discretionary, or non-ITA,
searches carried out by police forces for which we can reject the null hypothesis of equal search-
success rates among racial groups. The ¯rst column gives the percentage of all discretionary
searches accounted for by these forces, while the next two columns give the percent of discretionary
searches of blacks or Hispanics accounted for by these police forces.
We report these percentages for three motorist types: the rows labelled Black refer to police
forces for which we rejected the null for black motorists, Hispanic if we rejected for Hispanics, and
Minority for rejection of the null for either Hispanics or blacks. Each of the three sections of the
table refers to a di®erent measure of search success. The tests are labelled KPT for the direct
comparison of observed search success rates (which do not distinguish between discretionary and
non-discretionary searches), HM for the widest bounds, given in equation (4), and AGO for the
bounds that are narrowed using the inequality Pr
0 · Pr
1. For the bounds tests, we reject unbiased
policing if and only if the upper limit of the con¯dence interval around the bounds on the minority
rate does not exceed the lower limit of the con¯dence interval around the bounds of the white
19For our analysis, we obtained the population of individuals age 18 or older in each city or county corresponding to
each police or sheri® department in the sample, and the state population for the State Police. Ideally, the population
of motorists should be used, but the census information is more readily available.
12rate. We report results for the 95-percent and 99 percent con¯dence intervals. Our discussion of
table 3 below focuses on the column corresponding to the 95-percent con¯dence intervals under the
heading non-ITA Searches and the rows corresponding to Minority,
According to the KPT test, police forces biased against minorities account for 67 percent of
total searches, if the success measure is the drug ¯nd rate. In regards to general contraband ¯nds,
the police forces found to be biased under the KPT test account for 55 percent of discretionary
searches. For searches resulting in arrest, biased police forces account for 46 percent of discretionary
searches according to the KPT test.
We ¯nd that police forces that are found to be biased under the HM bounds account for a small
share of total searches. The table shows that using the HM bounds, it is possible to reject unbiased
policing against minorities for at most 2.3 percent of searches carried out, looking at the bottom
panel of the table labelled Guilt 3: Arrests from Searches. This is because, despite the apparently
large di®erences in success rates by race, the proportions of ITA searches are too large to prevent
overlap of the bounds for the discretionary search success rates.
However the AGO test suggests a picture much closer to that of the KPT test: biased police
forces account for a large share of discretionary searches. Using Drug Finds as the success measure,
police forces biased against minorities account for 42 percent of total searches according to the
AGO test, compared to 67 percent for the KPT test. The other de¯nitions of success yield similar
results. In regards to contraband ¯nds, biased police forces account for 35 percent of discretionary
searches under the AGO test, while for searches resulting in arrest, biased police forces account
for 29 percent of discretionary searches. Thus while the information that ITA success rates are
lower than for discretionary searches does reduce the rate of rejection of unbiased policing when
compared with the KPT test, it raises the rejection rate when compared with the HM bounds.
Most of the police bias that we can detect is directed against Hispanics rather than blacks.
According to the KPT test for contraband, police biased against blacks account for 35 percent of
discretionary searches, whereas those biased against Hispanics account for 38 percent. According
to the AGO test however, the share of searches by police biased against blacks is only 6 percent,
compared to 32 percent for police biased against Hispanics. It is clear from the larger di®erence
in the case of the AGO test that the rate of non-discretionary searches is a more important factor
for black searches than for Hispanics.
According to the AGO test, police biased against blacks account for a much smaller share of
searches of blacks than they do of total searches. The opposite is true for Hispanics, though the
e®ect is less pronounced. According to the AGO test for drug ¯nds, police biased against blacks
account for about 1 percent of searches of blacks, compared to 7 percent of total discretionary
searches. For the other success measures, the pattern is similar. Police biased against Hispanics,
on the other hand, account for large shares of searches of Hispanics as well as large shares of total
discretionary searches.
135 Discussion
The tests presented above are based on contrasting assumptions about the di®erence in ¯nd rates
for ITA searches. The KPT test implicitly assumes that ITA and discretionary search-sucess rates
are identical, while the AGO test assumes that the minority ITA ¯nd rate can be as low as zero,
but no greater than the non-ITA ¯nd rate. Overall, the AGO assumption, that success rates for
non-discretionary searches are no greater than those for discretionary search, results in a signi¯cant
tightening of the bounds. Except in the case of arrests from searches, it is clear that far fewer police
forces appear biased against blacks under the AGO test than under the KPT test. This is because
the AGO test is more conservative than the KPT test, in that it attributes di®erences in ¯nd rates
by race to disparities in the ¯nd rates of non-discretionary search. Thus the di®erence between the
KPT and AGO rejection rates measures the extent to which separate tabulation of hit rates for
discretionary and non-discretionary search would be helpful in identifying biased policing, over and
above the information already contained in the statement that ITA ¯nd rates are lower.
If ¯nd rates on minority motorists are lower than for whites, and the rate of ITA search is
non-zero in both cases, the AGO test will assume that the ITA hit rate for whites was equal to
the average for whites, and that for minorities it was zero. The HM test on the other hand, would
assume in this case that the ITA ¯nd rate for whites was one, further reducing the probability
of rejection of the unbiased policing hypothesis. Note that to the extent that ITA hit rates for
minorities are greater than zero or those for whites less than the discretionary success rate, our
estimates under the AGO test of the share of searches by biased police will under-estimate the
actual share.
Since the di®erence in rejection rates among the tests is quite large, it would be useful to know
whether ITA ¯nd rates have to be implausibly lower than those for non-ITA searches for the AGO
results to obtain. We do not have a measure of plausibility, but we can carry out the tests under
the assumption that ITA ¯nd rates are bounded below by some proportion ° 2 [0;1] of the ¯nd
rates for non-ITA searches, and above by Pr
1, that is, Pr
0 2 [°Pr
1;Pr
1]. Note that ° = 1 corresponds
to the KPT test, since in this case Pr
0 = Pr
1 = Qr, while ° = 0 corresponds to the AGO test. We
can ask, for instance, to what extent do the di®erences in rejection rates depend on the fact that
the AGO test allows ITA hit rates to be as low as zero, rather than bounding them below by 10
percent or 25 percent of the discretionary ¯nd rate?






(1 ¡ ¼r) + ¼r°
¸
:
In this case, we derived con¯dence intervals as in the AGO test. See the appendix for details.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
In Table 4 we report results for ¯ve values of °. We ¯nd that the rejection rate for drug ¯nds
on blacks remains essentially at the same level as under the AGO test until ° is above 0.75, while
14for Hispanics, nearly half of the di®erence between the two tests is gone by the time ° reaches 0.5.
In fact, if we look at the 95-percent con¯dence intervals for Hispanics, setting °=0.25 increases
the share of searches by rejected police forces by about 13 percentage points. With regards to
black drivers, these results mean that even slightly lower success rates for ITA searches will result
in much lower rejection rates, and hence it is important, as the AGO report claims, to take into
account the role of ITA searches of black motorists before concluding in favor of racial bias. This
does not appear to be the case in regards to Hispanics however; even success rates of zero on ITA
search cannot explain away the large share of searches accounted for by police forces who fail the
KPT test, and success rates on ITA search would have to be very low relative to non-ITA search in
order for the share of searches not to increase signi¯cantly above the shares implied by our AGO
test.
A similar question arises in explaining the gap between AGO and the HM results; how critical
is it that ITA ¯nd rates be no greater than the discretionary ¯nd rate? We can ask, for instance, to
what extent do the di®erences in rejection rates depend on the fact that ITA hit rates are bounded
above by some number 10 percent or 25 percent greater than the discretionary ¯nd rate? We can
carry out the tests under the assumption that ITA ¯nd rates are bounded above by some number
between Pr










1 + (1 ¡ ¸); for ¸ 2 [0;1]. Note that ¸ = 1
corresponds to the AGO test, while ¸ = 0 corresponds to the HM test. From this parameterization,
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In Table 5 we show the results from allowing ¸ 2 [0:5;1:0]. We ¯nd that for black motorists,
the share of searches by biased police forces falls below 1 percent as ¸ falls to 0.5 when ¯nds are
measured as drugs or contraband, but that under the arrest rate measure, almost all the di®erence
between the HM and the AGO results disappears once ¸ falls below 0.75. For Hispanics, the test
gives results very close to the HM test for ¸ < 0:5 (not shown) for all three measures of search
success. In general, as the minority row shows, the percent of searches by biased police is visibly
greater than for the HM test for ¸ ¸ 0:75, but that the greatest share of additional rejections occurs
when ¸ is increased from 0:875 to 1. Hence what is critical for the AGO test is that the ITA ¯nd
rate be not much greater than the discretionary ¯nd rate, not that the ITA ¯nd rate is actually
lower.20
6 Other Predictors of Racial Bias
In general, it may be useful to know what sort of police forces tend to be biased. In particular, are
these police forces the same ones that are identi¯ed as biased by more conventional tests of racial
pro¯ling? Are our results driven by a few large police forces? In this section we use census data for
20We also conducted the bounds test with the opposite assumption, that ITA ¯nd rates were uniformly higher
than discretionary ¯nd rates. The results of this test were closer to the HM test. The reason that this test is not as
powerful as the AGO test is that, as Table 2 indicates, many police forces reported zero success rates for minorities.
In these cases it is far more useful to have information that bounds the white success rate above zero than to have
restrictions on the black ¯nd rates, which are point-identi¯ed when the observed success rate is zero.
15the counties in which these police are based in order to compute racial-composition benchmarks.
We also report the results of our test for the three of the largest police forces in the state.
[Table 6 about here.]
In Table 6 we organize our results according to the tra±c stop disparity index score of the police
forces used in the Annual Report. This table shows searches ranked by the stop-disparity index
and for each quintile of the stop-disparity distribution reports the fraction of non-ITA searches
accounted for by law enforcement agencies that fail the AGO and KPT tests with 95-percent
con¯dence intervals. The sum of the rows for each quintile under the AGO column add up to the
corresponding row for the AGO test reported in Table 3. Similarly for the KPT column.
We ¯nd that the relationship between racial disparity and indicators of biased policing is quite
weak. First, at the top quintile of the disparity index, the probability of rejecting unbiased policing
for a police force is quite low. For instance, using drug ¯nds as search success, we ¯nd that police
forces that fail the AGO test of bias against black or Hispanic drivers and that fall in the top
quintile of the stop-disparity index account for only about 2 to 3 percent of all non-ITA searches.
Agencies that fail the KPT test in the top quintile represent about 3 to 6 percent of all non-ITA
searches. Using contraband ¯nds as search success, the fraction of non-ITA searches represented by
police forces that fall in the top stop-disparity quintile and fail the AGO test of racial bias against
blacks is about 3 percent, and about 3 percent for those agencies that fail the AGO test of bias
against Hispanics. Agencies that fail the KPT tests of bias against blacks account for 6 percent,
and about 3 percent for the test on searches of Hispanic drivers.
Such a low rejection rate might seem to be a consequence of the weakness of the AGO test,
but our second result shows this not so: we reject unbiased policing for police forces at the bottom
quintile of the index at rates that are not systematically lower than for the top quintile. Indeed,
for Hispanics, the rejection rate is much higher at the bottom than the top of the distribution
of the disparity index. For instance, the AGO test for drug ¯nds rejects unbiased policing for
agencies representing about 14 percent of all non-ITA searches by agencies in the bottom quintile
of the search-disparity index. For blacks, the fraction of searches represented by police forces in
the bottom quintile who fail the AGO test is about 0.6 percent. Hence, according to our tests, not
only does the disparity-index approach identify too many police forces as racially biased, it also
identi¯es the wrong ones. Of course, since our AGO test is quite conservative, in the sense that it
allows ITA hit rates to be zero, it is not surprising that we reject at a low rate overall, but the fact
that the correlation with the disparity index appears so low indicates that concerns with racial bias
are not well served by focussing on the disparity index as a performance measure.21
[Table 7 about here.]
Three of the largest police forces in the state are the Missouri State Police, the St. Louis City
Police Department, and the Kansas City Police Department. Table 7 shows that these account for
about, respectively, 13 percent, 5 percent and 3 percent of all non-ITA searches in our data set.
21We conducted this exercise with the alternative search-disparity index described earlier, and we reached similar
conclusions.
16The city departments account for much larger shares of searches of blacks: about 18 percent (St.
Louis City) and 10 percent (Kansas City). The State Police accounts for 24 percent of all non-ITA
searches of Hispanics, and the city departments account only for about 2 percent (St. Louis City)
and 8 percent (Kansas City). Under the AGO test for drug ¯nds, we reject unbiased policing with
respect to Hispanics for the State Police with all three measures of search success, and we reject
unbiased policing with respect to Hispanics for the St. Louis City police department only when
using Drug Finds as the measure of search success. Hence we conclude that both of these agencies
are biased against Hispanic motorists. However with respect to searches of black motorists we do
not reject unbiased policing for any of the three police forces. While the state police accounts for
a large share of Hispanic searches, the fraction of Hispanic searches of police forces that fail the
AGO test is much larger than this share, and even in the absence of this agency, we would still
reject unbiased policing for forces representing about 10 to 15 percent of the searches of Hispanics.
[Table 8 about here.]
[Table 9 about here.]
In Table 8 we present some statistics on demographic characteristics of police forces that fail
the AGO test of unbiased policing behavior, and similarly for police forces that do not fail in
Table 9. When using drug or contraband ¯nds as measures of search success, we learn that, on
average, areas with police forces that are biased have a larger fraction of white population. These
¯ndings con¯rm the explanation we o®ered earlier for the fact that searches by police biased against
minorities account for a much larger share of all discretionary searches than of searches of minorities.
We also learn that areas with police forces that fail the tests of unbiased policing against Hispanic
drivers appear to be more a²uent than areas where police forces do not fail the AGO test. This is
indicated by the average and median values for the median household income, which are higher in
areas with biased police forces, and by the average and median values for the poverty rate, which
are lower in areas with biased police forces. Areas with police forces biased against black drivers
appear to be less a²uent that areas where police forces do not fail the AGO test. The fraction of
sheri® departments appears to be higher among police forces that seem biased against minorities.
Finally, police forces that failed the tests of unbiased policing against black drivers conducted fewer
stops and searches than polices forces which did not fail the tests, but police forces that failed the
test of unbiased policing against Hispanic drivers conducted more stops and searches than police
agencies which did not fail the tests.
The overall impression that emerges from this analysis is that black and Hispanic motorists
are most at risk from biased police forces when travelling through areas where minorities represent
a relatively small population share. It is not clear from the data why the patterns should di®er,
but it does suggest the possibility that blacks or Hispanics are searched because their skin color
makes them seem more out of place in small white towns. This would be consistent with the
opinion expressed by the court in State v. Dean, that good police work requires o±cers to be more
suspicious of motorists who do not ¯t in with the local community.22
22In the 1975 case State v. Dean, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that \the fact that a person is obviously out
of place in a particular neighborhood is one of several factors that may be considered by an o±cer". Regardless of
177 Conclusion
In this paper we extended the KPT test for biased policing to cover cases where data were available
only in the form of summary statistics. This allows the test to be applied to data sets covering a
much larger number of motorists than was the case for previous applications, which were based
on individual records, data which are rarely in the public domain. However when such aggregate
data do not distinguish between the results of discretionary and non-discretionary searches, the
test cannot be applied directly.
The 2001 Annual Tra±c-Stop Report of the Missouri Attorney General's O±ce (AGO) covers
1,389,947 tra±c stops. The report claims that di®erences in search-success rates by race should
not be interpreted as evidence of racial bias because the statistics re°ect mandatory as well as
discretionary searches. We used bounds methods to develop tests for racial bias at the level of the
individual police force that allow us to examine the plausibility of this explanation. We applied
our bounds tests at the level of individual police forces, and found evidence in support of racial
bias against African-American and Hispanic motorists, even when allowing for lower success rates
of non-discretionary searches.
Our ¯rst test involved non-parametric bounds. These were quite wide, and did not permit
rejection of unbiased policing except for a few police forces accounting for a very small fraction,
about 2 percent, of all discretionary searches. By contrast, the KPT test resulted in rejection of
unbiased policing for police forces accounting for 40 to 67 percent of searches when success was
measured according to drug ¯nds, and 40 to 65 percent for other measures. Since the KPT test
does not allow for non-discretionary search, the larger rejection rates are not surprising. Thus these
results are consistent with the statement in the AGO report.
We therefore re¯ned our test by imposing a restriction that we inferred from the AGO statement:
that success rates of non-discretionary searches are lower than for discretionary searches. We showed
how this would theoretically tighten the bounds, as well as the con¯dence intervals around our non-
parametric bounds. Our basic ¯nding was that a large share of searches in Missouri are carried
out by police forces who appear biased against minority motorists. Most of the bias appears to be
directed against Hispanic rather then black motorists. The police forces that appear biased against
black motorists tend to be found in areas with a relatively large white population.
We also found that restricting the lower bound on non-discretionary searches of minorities did
not have a strong e®ect on the results for blacks until the lower bound rose above 75 percent of the
¯nd rate for discretionary searches, while for Hispanics, the measure of biased policing increased
signi¯cantly for even relatively low values of this lower bound. Thus the AGO explanation is more
persuasive with respect to blacks than Hispanics. We also found that allowing the non-discretionary
¯nd rate to rise as much as 25 percent above that for discretionary searches would still result in
rejection rates substantially above those of the non-parametric bounds.
The AGO report suggests measuring the disparity between the population compositions of
motorists searched and of locations residents as a rough guide to racial pro¯ling. We ¯nd the
whether this view is still acceptable, the point is that the court at that time felt that this was part of standard police
practice. Our test results suggest that this practice is associated with biased policing that is not justi¯ed by the
search outcomes.
18relation between this pro¯ling measure and our measure of racial bias to be fairly weak. While
for black motorists we are more likely to reject biased policing for agencies in the top quintile of
the disparity index distribution, we only reject police forces in the top quintile that account for
about 3 percent of all discretionary searches. For Hispanic motorists, we are much more likely to
reject police forces in the bottom quintile of the disparity index than at the top, indicating that
the disparity index is not useful for identifying racial bias.
Finally, our result that a signi¯cant number of searches are carried out by racially biased police
forces is not the result of a few large, biased, police forces. For the three largest police forces in
the state, we do not reject unbiased searches with respect to blacks. However we do ¯nd that the
searches by the State Police are biased against Hispanics. While the State Police accounts for a
large share of searches of Hispanics, we rejected unbiased policing with respect to a much larger
share.
State data collection e®orts could make testing easier with some improvements in the way
they present the tra±c statistics to the public and researchers. First, states should emphasize
the collection of outcome variables, such as the nature and quantity of contraband found, as well
as citations and arrests resulting from the search. In addition, it would be extremely helpful
if the statistics reported tabulated the outcomes of discretionary and non-discretionary searches
separately. While our tests are able to extract some information from the combined statistics
currently issued, the actual share of searches accounted for by biased police may be signi¯cantly
higher than what our results suggest.
The model that gives rise to our tests is based on a few key economic assumptions that could be
the focus of future research. For instance, we assume that police act as though they were maximizing
the number of arrests, and that they are aware of the probability of guilt conditional on observables.
Likewise, we assume that motorists are aware of the probability of being searched, and that the
risk of search deters them from carrying contraband. While standard for economic modelling,
these assumptions are not known to be true, and our results should be viewed as illustrating the
potential of the economic approach rather than as de¯nitive judgments. 23
Subject to the above proviso, our results suggest that police bias or animus against minorities
is a plausible explanation of at least some of the disparate impact faced by minorities in Missouri,
and that therefore the problem of disparate impact by race could be signi¯cantly reduced without
reducing police e®ectiveness. According to Kennedy (1997), the mainstream view of the courts,
at least until recently, was that \race can be appropriately used as a factor of suspicion... so
long as this use of race is reasonably related to law enforcement and not a mere pretext for racial
harassment". In the case of Missouri, to the extent that the objective of discretionary motor-vehicle
searches is to detect the transport of contraband, it appears that a signi¯cant share of the excess
burden faced by minorities is unrelated to law enforcement.
23Alternative economic interpretations of racial patterns in police search data are o®ered in Dharmapala and Ross
(2004) and Bunzel and Marcoul (2003); these argue that the KPT test is in fact too weak, and that equal ¯nd rates
can arise even when the police are racially biased.
19Appendix: Con¯dence Intervals for Search Success Rates
For each of the di®erent cases that we examine, we follow Horowitz and Manski (2000) and construct
100£® percent con¯dence intervals for the identi¯cation bounds of the form
h
^ PL ¡ D; ^ PH + D
i
;
solving for a level of D to ensure that, conditional on the probability of non-discretionary search,
the probability of coverage of the identi¯cation region [PL;PH] is at least ® :
Pr
³
^ PL ¡ D · PL;PH · ^ PH + Dj^ ¼
´
¸ ®:
In the following sections, we derive an expression containing D that can be easily solved numerically.
For our tests we compute values of D for each race-agency cell, and check whether the results imply
that the con¯dence interval for white motorists lies above that for minority motorists.
A HM Bounds
Let ^ Q indicate the sample search success rate in a race-agency cell with N searches. Since successes
in each search are independent of success in other searches carried out by the agency, ^ Q follows
a binomial distribution, with expectation Q and variance ¾2 = Q(1 ¡ Q). Standard asymptotic
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According to equation (4), after suppressing the race superscript, the discretionary ¯nd rate is










The sample analog of this interval is
(7)
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Following Imbens and Manski (2003) we construct a con¯dence interval for the parameter P1 of
the form
h
^ PL ¡ D; ^ PH + D
i
with the distance D constructed to guarantee that
Pr
³
^ PL ¡ D · P1 · ^ PH + D
´
= ®:
Using the formula for the true value of P1; derived from equation (3),
Pr
µ
^ PL ¡ D ·
Q ¡ ¼P0
1 ¡ ¼
· ^ PH + D
¶
= ®:
20Now we apply the formulas for the estimated upper and lower bounds:
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To implement this, we set the parameters ¾ and ¼ to their observed values; thus D must solve:
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Using the fact that this expression is concave in P0, the probability is minimized at each of the end



















For this and the remaining cases we follow Horowitz and Manski (2000) and construct 100£®%
con¯dence intervals for the identi¯cation bounds with the form
h
^ PL ¡ D; ^ PH + D
i
: The bounds
assume that the search success rate for non-discretionary searches is lower than for discretionary
searches, Pr
0 · Pr
1; as in equation (5). Suppressing again the race superscript, the bounds are




The distance D in the con¯dence intervals is constructed to ensure that, conditional on the proba-
bility of a non-discretionary search, the probability of coverage of the identi¯cation region [PL;PH]
is at least ® :
Pr
³
^ PL ¡ D · PL;PH · ^ PH + D
´
= ®:






















We determine D by replacing the parameters ¾ and ¼ with their sample values:
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B.1.1 AGO and KPT




setting ° = 0 is equivalent to the AGO bounds de¯ned above, and setting ° = 1 is equivalent
to assuming that Pr
0 = Pr
1 = Qr, which yields the test where we do not account for the e®ect of
non-discretionary searches. The bounds are given by
^ PL = ^ Q and ^ PH =
^ Q
(1 ¡ ¼) + ¼°
:





















Replacing the sample values of ¾ and ¼, we have that D must solve the following expression:
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which yields the standard con¯dence intervals for the sample success rate ^ Q.24
B.1.2 AGO and HM
In this case the bounds are constructed assuming that the search success rate of non-discretionary
searches is bounded above by a number that may exceed the search success rate of discretionary
searches. To implement this, the upper bound is set at the value of P1 corresponding to P0 = 0,
i.e., PH =
Q
1¡¼. We then parameterize the lower bound to cover values of P0 2 [P1;1] by setting
P0 = ¸P1 + (1 ¡ ¸), and letting ¸ 2 [0;1]. Thus when ¸ = 0 we have P0 = 1, which gives us the
same lower bound as in the HM bounds, PL =
Q¡¼
1¡¼ , and when ¸ = 1, we have P0 = P1, which gives
us the lower bound as in the AGO bounds, PL = Q. The expressions for the bounds are then
^ PL =
^ Q ¡ ¼ (1 ¡ ¸)
(1 ¡ ¼) + ¼¸

























24Notice also that all of our con¯dence intervals coincide with the standard con¯dence intervals for the sample
success rate ^ Q when the search success rate is point-identi¯ed, that is when ¼ = 0.
22Therefore D must solve the following expression.
©
µ















Becker, G. S., \Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy
76 (1968), 169{217.
Bunzel, H. and P. Marcoul, \Can Racially Unbiased Police Perpetuate Long-Run Discrimination?"
Manuscript, Iowa State University, 2003.
Dharmapala, D. and S. L. Ross, \Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Additional Theory and
Evidence," Manuscript, University of Connecticut, 2004.
Dominitz, J. and R. P. Sherman, \Nonparametric Analysis of Mixture Models with Veri¯cation
with an Application to Test Score Data," Manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University, 2003.
Gross, S. R. and K. Y. Barnes, \Road Work: Racial Pro¯ling and Drug Interdiction on the High-
way," Michigan Law Review 101 (2002), 651{754.
Horowitz, J. L. and C. F. Manski, \Identi¯cation and Robustness with Contaminated and Cor-
rupted Data," Econometrica 63 (1995), 281{302.
|, \Nonparametric Analysis of Randomized Experiments with Missing Covariate and Outcome
Data," Journal of the American Statistical Association 95 (2000), 77{84.
Imbens, G. W. and C. F. Manski, \Con¯dence Intervals for Partially Identi¯ed Parameters,"
Manuscript, Northwestern University, 2003.
Kennedy, R., Race, Crime and the Law (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).
Knowles, J., N. Persico and P. Todd, \Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evi-
dence," Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001), 203{229.
Kreider, B. and J. Pepper, \Inferring Disability Status from Corrupt Data," Manuscript, Iowa
State University, 2003.
Manski, C. F., Identi¯cation Problems in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995).
Pepper, J., \The Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Receipt: A Nonparametric Bounds
Analysis," Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2000), 472{488.
U.S. Department of Justice, \Tra±c Stop Data Collection Policies for State Police, 2001," Bureau
of Justice Statistics: Fact Sheet, 2001.
23Zingra®, M. T., H. M. Mason, W. R. Smith, D. Tomaskovic-Devey, P. Warren, H. L. McMurray
and C. R. Fenlon, \Evaluating North Carolina State Highway Patrol Data: Citations, Warnings,
and Searches in 1998," North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, 2000.


























Figure 1: ITA frequency White Drivers.


























Figure 2: ITA frequency Black Drivers.





























Figure 3: ITA frequency Hispanic Drivers.
27Table 1: Characteristics of law enforcement agencies with 5 or more searches for both white and
African American drivers or for both white and Hispanic drivers.
Statistic
a Stops Searches ITA Drug Contraband Search Stops of Stops of




c sum 1,158,922 84,652 44,475 14,434 17,515 11,630 572,842 764,215
mean 6,067.65 443.20 232.85 75.57 91.70 60.89 2,999.17 4,001.13
median 2,243.00 168.00 78.00 25.00 34.00 28.00 1,124.00 1,475.00
st. dev. 24,611 1,125 635 328 362 116 11,130 16,925
White sum 963,074 61,209 30,781 11,663 13,909 8,677 470,108 631,004
mean 5,042.27 320.47 161.16 61.06 72.82 45.43 2,461.30 3,303.69
median 1,853.00 131.00 50.00 20.00 25.00 22.00 948.00 1,173.00
st. dev. 22,100 868 489 292 320 88 9,885 15,132
Black sum 174,193 20,574 12,170 2,524 3,267 2,716 90,141 115,266
mean 912.01 107.72 63.72 13.21 17.10 14.22 471.94 603.49
median 160.00 23.00 11.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 74.00 107.00
st. dev. 3,173 355 219 45 58 44 1,654 2,164
Hispanics sum 21,655 2,869 1,524 247 339 237 12,593 17,945
mean 113.38 15.02 7.98 1.29 1.77 1.24 65.93 93.95
median 30.00 5.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.00 25.00
st. dev. 513 49 25 7 7 3 290 430
aThe mean and standard deviations were computed using equal weights.
bYoung refers to drivers of age 29 or younger.
cNumber of agencies = 191
28Table 2: Characteristics of search and ¯nd rates in agencies with 5 or more searches for both white
and African American drivers or for both white and Hispanic drivers.
Statistic
a Searches ITA Drug Contraband Searchs Stops of Stops of
Race of /Stops Searches Finds Finds Arrests Young
b Male
Motorist /Searches /Searches /Searches /Searches Drivers Drivers
/Stops /Stops
All
c proportion 0.0730 0.5254 0.1705 0.2069 0.1374 0.4943 0.6594
st. dev. (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
White proportion 0.0636 0.5029 0.1905 0.2272 0.1418 0.4881 0.6552
st. dev. (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Black proportion 0.1181 0.5915 0.1227 0.1588 0.1320 0.5175 0.6617
st. dev. (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Hispanics proportion 0.1325 0.5312 0.0861 0.1182 0.0826 0.5815 0.8287
st. dev. (0.006) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.004) (0.003)
Disparity Indices
Population Stops Search Stops Searches
Share Share Share share share
/Population /Population
share share
White 0.85 0.83 0.72 0.97 0.85
Black 0.10 0.15 0.24 1.48 2.40
Hispanics 0.02 0.02 0.03 1.03 1.86
aThe standard deviation for the proportions were computed assumming a binomial distribution.
bYoung refers to drivers of age 29 or younger.
cNumber of agencies = 191
29Table 3: Share of Searches by Biased Police Forces. KPT and Bounds Tests.
Bounds non-ITA Searches Searches of Blacks Searches of Hisp.
99%CI 95% CI 99%CI 95% CI 99%CI 95% CI
Guilt 1: Drug Finds
KPT 0.3123 0.3408 0.2242 0.2631 0.3197 0.3398
Black HM 0.0005 0.0015 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007 0.0007
AGO 0.0658 0.0710 0.0074 0.0113 0.0312 0.0342
KPT 0.4654 0.6227 0.4110 0.6103 0.4974 0.6015
Hispanic HM 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0045
AGO 0.3791 0.3988 0.3364 0.3588 0.3717 0.3926
KPT 0.5985 0.6673 0.5704 0.6418 0.5546 0.6297
Minority HM 0.0005 0.0029 0.0006 0.0013 0.0007 0.0052
AGO 0.3995 0.4243 0.3425 0.3688 0.3792 0.4030
Guilt 2: Contraband Finds
KPT 0.3304 0.3574 0.2649 0.2934 0.3249 0.3487
Black HM 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
AGO 0.0597 0.0628 0.0064 0.0104 0.0260 0.0268
KPT 0.3733 0.3883 0.2197 0.2250 0.4253 0.4513
Hispanic HM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AGO 0.2901 0.3244 0.1539 0.1787 0.3219 0.3539
KPT 0.5194 0.5525 0.4022 0.4294 0.4900 0.5323
Minority HM 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
AGO 0.3093 0.3466 0.1592 0.1880 0.3286 0.3613
Guilt 3: Arrests from Searches
KPT 0.0887 0.2241 0.0499 0.2262 0.0662 0.1316
Black HM 0.0235 0.0235 0.0006 0.0006 0.0126 0.0126
AGO 0.0459 0.0548 0.0049 0.0099 0.0230 0.0283
KPT 0.2947 0.4200 0.1872 0.3644 0.3881 0.4565
Hispanic HM 0.0235 0.0235 0.0006 0.0006 0.0126 0.0126
AGO 0.1148 0.2693 0.0683 0.1611 0.0892 0.3472
KPT 0.3313 0.4600 0.2183 0.3816 0.4030 0.4803
Minority HM 0.0235 0.0235 0.0006 0.0006 0.0126 0.0126
AGO 0.1324 0.2926 0.0723 0.1688 0.0952 0.3546
30Table 4: Rejection of Unbiased Policing. Parameterized AGO/KPT Bounds.
° Drug Finds Contraband Finds Search Arrests
99%CI 95% CI 99%CI 95% CI 99%CI 95% CI
0.00 0.0658 0.0710 0.0597 0.0628 0.0459 0.0548
Black 0.25 0.0686 0.0714 0.0605 0.0632 0.0494 0.0552
0.50 0.0693 0.0714 0.0625 0.0656 0.0514 0.0573
0.75 0.0714 0.2071 0.1695 0.1747 0.0534 0.0950
1.00 0.3123 0.3408 0.3304 0.3574 0.0887 0.2241
0.00 0.3791 0.3988 0.2901 0.3244 0.1148 0.2693
Hispanic 0.25 0.3928 0.5270 0.3184 0.3315 0.2639 0.2927
0.50 0.4150 0.5659 0.3248 0.3655 0.2911 0.2947
0.75 0.4249 0.6064 0.3557 0.3883 0.2947 0.3130
1.00 0.4654 0.6227 0.3733 0.3883 0.2947 0.4200
0.00 0.3995 0.4243 0.3093 0.3466 0.1324 0.2926
Minority 0.25 0.4160 0.5530 0.3384 0.3541 0.2838 0.3160
0.50 0.4389 0.5919 0.3468 0.3905 0.3110 0.3200
0.75 0.4509 0.6342 0.4847 0.5225 0.3161 0.3407
1.00 0.5985 0.6673 0.5194 0.5525 0.3313 0.4600
31Table 5: Rejection of Unbiased Policing. Parameterized AGO/HM Bounds.
¸ Drug Finds Contraband Finds Search Arrests
99%CI 95% CI 99%CI 95% CI 99%CI 95% CI
0.500 0.0027 0.0085 0.0052 0.0081 0.0257 0.0257
Black 0.625 0.0052 0.0096 0.0287 0.0362 0.0257 0.0269
0.750 0.0313 0.0369 0.0348 0.0389 0.0257 0.0360
0.875 0.0635 0.0658 0.0581 0.0620 0.0360 0.0393
1.000 0.0658 0.0710 0.0597 0.0628 0.0459 0.0548
0.500 0.0015 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0310 0.0374
Hispanic 0.625 0.0325 0.0548 0.0362 0.0575 0.0374 0.0540
0.750 0.0976 0.1199 0.0832 0.0960 0.0419 0.0540
0.875 0.1582 0.2323 0.1254 0.2990 0.0540 0.0747
1.000 0.3791 0.3988 0.2901 0.3244 0.1148 0.2693
0.500 0.0042 0.0099 0.0052 0.0081 0.0332 0.0396
Minority 0.625 0.0377 0.0644 0.0414 0.0702 0.0396 0.0574
0.750 0.1054 0.1333 0.0945 0.1114 0.0442 0.0665
0.875 0.1763 0.2527 0.1429 0.3205 0.0665 0.0905
1.000 0.3995 0.4243 0.3093 0.3466 0.1324 0.2926
32Table 6: Rejection of Unbiased Policing and the Stop-Disparity Index.
Quintile non-ITA Searches Searches of Blacks Searches of Hisp.
AGO KPT AGO KPT AGO KPT
Guilt 1: Drug Finds
0-20 0.0068 0.1407 0.0015 0.0650 0.0007 0.2394
20-40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Black 40-60 0.0010 0.1096 0.0006 0.1508 0.0000 0.0468
60-80 0.0310 0.0310 0.0056 0.0056 0.0149 0.0149
80-100 0.0322 0.0594 0.0036 0.0418 0.0186 0.0387
0-20 0.1425 0.2888 0.2394 0.4403 0.0572 0.1398
20-40 0.0692 0.0795 0.0289 0.0346 0.0461 0.0617
Hispanic 40-60 0.1354 0.1606 0.0635 0.0839 0.2431 0.2833
60-80 0.0162 0.0404 0.0130 0.0243 0.0126 0.0506
80-100 0.0354 0.0533 0.0139 0.0272 0.0335 0.0662
0-20 0.2350 0.2375 0.2462 0.2468 0.2840 0.2877
20-40 0.0183 0.0360 0.0030 0.0109 0.0037 0.0312
Minority 40-60 0.0160 0.1369 0.0143 0.1680 0.0208 0.0818
60-80 0.0866 0.1288 0.0614 0.0977 0.0572 0.1056
80-100 0.0684 0.1280 0.0439 0.1184 0.0372 0.1234
Guilt 2: Contraband Finds
0-20 0.0074 0.1414 0.0024 0.0658 0.0015 0.2401
20-40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Black 40-60 0.0000 0.1175 0.0000 0.1568 0.0000 0.0543
60-80 0.0244 0.0401 0.0048 0.0293 0.0097 0.0171
80-100 0.0310 0.0585 0.0032 0.0415 0.0156 0.0372
0-20 0.0888 0.1009 0.0754 0.0851 0.0476 0.0654
20-40 0.0655 0.0758 0.0232 0.0289 0.0349 0.0506
Hispanic 40-60 0.1340 0.1591 0.0634 0.0838 0.2387 0.2788
60-80 0.0088 0.0201 0.0067 0.0099 0.0074 0.0164
80-100 0.0273 0.0323 0.0100 0.0174 0.0253 0.0401
0-20 0.1867 0.1893 0.0671 0.0677 0.2639 0.2677
20-40 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0126
Minority 40-60 0.0088 0.1298 0.0067 0.1604 0.0074 0.0684
60-80 0.0826 0.1117 0.0591 0.0904 0.0550 0.0848
80-100 0.0684 0.1138 0.0551 0.1063 0.0349 0.0989
Guilt 3: Arrests from Searches
0-20 0.0065 0.0083 0.0015 0.0025 0.0037 0.0037
20-40 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Black 40-60 0.0020 0.1107 0.0008 0.1506 0.0007 0.0476
60-80 0.0154 0.0410 0.0045 0.0337 0.0089 0.0320
80-100 0.0308 0.0641 0.0030 0.0394 0.0149 0.0483
0-20 0.0430 0.1652 0.0564 0.2288 0.0275 0.0818
20-40 0.0395 0.0395 0.0152 0.0152 0.0253 0.0253
Hispanic 40-60 0.1387 0.1608 0.0658 0.0851 0.2424 0.2758
60-80 0.0197 0.0228 0.0133 0.0181 0.0186 0.0327
80-100 0.0285 0.0318 0.0104 0.0171 0.0335 0.0409
0-20 0.1822 0.1840 0.0690 0.0700 0.2669 0.2669
20-40 0.0012 0.0012 0.0005 0.0005 0.0030 0.0030
Minority 40-60 0.0179 0.1266 0.0081 0.1579 0.0149 0.0617
60-80 0.0405 0.0667 0.0396 0.0689 0.0357 0.0595
80-100 0.0508 0.0815 0.0516 0.0844 0.0342 0.0892
33Table 7: Largest Police Departments.
Missouri State Police St. Louis City P.D. Kansas City P.D.
Race non-ITA Share of non-ITA Share of non-ITA Share of
Searches Total Searches Total Searches Total
All 5,382 0.1340 1,907 0.0475 1,379 0.0343
Whites 4,528 0.1488 374 0.0123 448 0.0147
Blacks 533 0.0634 1,511 0.1798 828 0.0985
Hispanic 321 0.2387 22 0.0164 103 0.0766
Rejection of the Statistical Discrimination Model
Bounds Blacks Hispanics Blacks Hispanics Blacks Hispanics
Guilt 1: Drug Finds
KPT yes yes no yes no no
HM no no no no no no
AGO no yes no yes no no
Guilt 2: Contraband Finds
KPT yes yes no no no no
HM no no no no no no
AGO no yes no no no no
Guilt 3: Arrests from Searches
KPT no yes no no no no
HM no no no no no no
AGO no yes no no no no
34Table 8: Characteristics of Police Forces that Fail the AGO Test of Unbiased Policing
with 95% Con¯dence Intervals.
Variable Statistic Drug Finds Contraband Finds Arrests from Searches
Minority
Black Hispanic Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
Median mean 34,117.79 45,748.69 33,052.00 43,476.17 32,750.13 40,563.36
Household median 32,772.00 40,322.00 32,118.00 40,322.00 32,772.00 35,647.00
Income (1999) st. dev. 8,280.16 22,222.23 7,360.80 14,045.16 5,559.74 22,937.21
Share of mean 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.11
Poor median 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12
Population st. dev. 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05
Share of mean 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.88
White median 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.90
Population st. dev. 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.11
Share of mean 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08
Black median 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
Population st. dev. 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.11
Share of mean 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Hispanic median 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Population st. dev. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Total mean 1,814.79 5,812.44 1,637.00 5,137.25 1,558.00 3,570.16
Stops median 1,365.00 3,415.00 1,012.00 4,193.50 1,622.00 2,875.00
st. dev. 2,062.63 7,317.12 2,117.41 3,743.29 909.55 2,828.93
sum 34,481 185,998 26,192 123,294 23,370 89,254
Total mean 241.21 578.91 241.88 573.25 206.13 402.96
Searches median 126.00 413.50 97.50 515.50 163.00 305.00
st. dev. 365.07 562.14 397.22 381.41 239.46 301.60
sum 4,583 18,525 3,870 13,758 3,092 10,074
Number of agenciesa sum 19 32 16 24 15 25
Sheri® Depts. percentage 0.32 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.16
aThe State Police was excluded to compare the demographic indicators.
35Table 9: Characteristics of Police Forces that Do Not Fail the AGO Test of Unbiased Policing
with 95% Con¯dence Intervals.
Variable Statistic Drug Finds Contraband Finds Arrests from Searches
Minority
Black Hispanic Black Hispanic Black Hispanic
Median mean 41,559.94 39,816.64 41,529.63 40,431.08 41,507.06 40,853.96
Household median 36,117.00 35,352.00 36,240.00 35,177.00 36,363.00 36,111.00
Income (1999) st. dev. 20,208.94 18,778.69 20,078.40 20,132.57 20,074.18 18,964.15
Share of mean 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
Poor median 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12
Population st. dev. 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Share of mean 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
White median 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92
Population st. dev. 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Share of mean 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Black median 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Population st. dev. 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
Share of mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Hispanic median 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Population st. dev. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Total mean 4,685.39 4,111.92 4,652.24 4,291.49 4,641.78 4,523.81
Stops median 2,343.00 2,135.00 2,353.50 2,135.00 2,343.00 2,150.00
st. dev. 8,988.62 8,820.93 8,915.86 9,083.92 8,908.77 9,153.46
sum 801,201 649,684 809,490 712,388 812,312 746,428
Total mean 396.10 340.45 393.37 352.76 395.57 377.22
Searches median 173.00 148.50 172.50 150.50 171.00 151.00
st. dev. 749.97 744.91 743.85 755.03 747.13 766.01
sum 67,733 53,791 68,446 58,558 69,224 62,242
Number of agenciesa sum 171 158 174 166 175 165
Sheri® Depts. percentage 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19
aThe State Police was excluded to compare the demographic indicators.
36